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The One-Bank
Holding
Company
Conglomerate: Analysis and Evaluation
Franklin R. Edwards*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The last few years may mark a turning point in the evolution of
our financial structure. One-bank holding companies, which for
decades were a dormant and inconspicuous part of the financial
structure, surged into popularity as a device for circumventing the
restrictiveness of bank regulation. During the three-year period from
1965 to 1968, the number of one-bank holding companies increased by
more than 200.1 More important, in 1968 a sudden- change occurred:
most of our largest banks decided to form holding companies. First
National City Bank of New York, Chase Manhattan, Bank of
America, and six more of the twelve largest banks in the country either
formed or announced plans to form one-bank holding companies.
While this interest on the part of large banks is new, the idea of
one-bank holding companies is not. In fact, the current surge in activity
represents the acceleration of an existing trend rather than the
beginning of a new trend. For example, in 1955 there were 117 onebank holding companies in existence; in 1965 there were 550; and today
there are more than 800. In terms of the volume of bank assets or
deposits controlled by these companies, the trend is even more
striking-by the end of 1968 over 27 percent of the deposits held by
insured banks were controlled by existing or proposed one-bank
holding companies 2
Not surprisingly, this acceleration of activity has evoked a strong
reaction and, for a variety of reasons, has provoked hurried calls for
restraining legislation. To some observers, the trend toward one-bank
holding companies dramatically symbolizes the continuing threat of big
business to break out of the regulatory bonds which purportedly
* Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. I am indebted
to Miss Linda Nasif who provided many valuable suggestions during the preparation of this
study.
I. HOUSE CONII. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91st CONG., 1st SEss., THE GROWTH OF
UNREGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES-PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS I (Comm. Print 1969)
[hereinafter cited as BANKING AND CURRENCY PRINT]. As of December 31, 1968, 34 of the 100
largest banks either have formed or announced plans to form one-bank holding companies.
2. Id. at 1,5.
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protect the public against the economic tyrannies of the nineteenth
century business cartels Indeed, for those who harbor this fear and
wish to legislate one-bank holding companies out of existence, bank
holding companies may be merely an initial skirmish preliminary to an
all-out assault on "super-corporations."
The one-bank holding company is an attractive target. First, the
image of large banks growing even more powerful has always been an
anathema to a large segment of Americans of populist heritage;
secondly, banks are normally held to a higher duty to society because
of their special and privileged role as guardians of our money; and,
lastly, since banking is already a highly regulated industry, further
regulation may not evoke as much political opposition.
The fanatical trustbuster is not the only opposition. There is
opposition from those who, after careful consideration, have concluded
that one-bank holding companies are not in the public interest. Most
members of the Federal Reserve Board fall into this category. There is
also the usual opposition from varied special interest groups, who for
one reason or another feel threatened by holding companies. For
example, -multi-bank holding companies may oppose one-bank
companies because they (multi-bank companies) do not have the same
privileges of engaging in non-banking activities and therefore are at a
distinct competitive disadvantage. 4 Small banks, on the other hand,
fear a take-over by large banks, and many big banks are fearful of
being acquired by aggressive non-bank corporations.5
Thus, in response to strong opposition, the political tide is slowly
moving towards restrictive legislation that may well spell the demise of
the one-bank holding company movement.6 But regardless of its form,
the legislation ultimately adopted is certain to have an important
3. "[T]he entire structure of the American economy is being changed through
conglomerates centered around banking institutions. This is clearly a threat to everyone-both
inside and outside the financial community-and it is essential that the Congress act quickly to
provide meaningful remedies." 115 CONG. REC. 902 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1969) (remarks of
Representative Patman).

4.

Multi-bank holding companies are registered and regulated by the Federal Reserve Board

and are prohibited by law from owning non-banking subsidiaries. Although they would probably

prefer to possess additional non-banking powers, their safest course may be to support a position
against the broadening of such powers. Existing holding companies have the advantage of owning
many banks.

5. Leasco Corporation's proposed tender offer for the stock of Chemical Bank of New
York in February, 1969, was a bomb which awakened bankers to the competitive threat of
"outsiders."
6. On June 27, 1968, the House Banking and Currency Committee reported out legislation
which would severly curb the activities of banking conglomerates. See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1969,
at 37, col. 5.
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influence on the future of our financial structure since many of the
basic structural aspects are at issue. It therefore provides Congress with
a golden opportunity to make fundamental changes. 7 In effect,
Congress's task is to reappraise our financial system with a view
towards determining whether its underlying structure is still compatible
with present goals and contemporary needs and, if not, to determine
whether one-bank holding companies can make a meaningful contribution towards altering its structure.8
The purpose of this paper is to explore, analyze, and evaluate the
issues raised by the controversy over one-bank holding companies. If,
however, it succeeds in merely exposing the essence of these issues, the
author will consider it a success. Although in the following discussion
evaluations are made and conclusions drawn, these are obviously
provisional judgments which await the results of more thorough
research.
II.

AN EXPLANATION

FOR THE GROWTH OF ONE-BANK

HOLDING

COMPANIES

A.

What Are One-Bank Holding Companies

One-bank holding companies are the bank holding companies
exempt from registration (and therefore regulation) under the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956.1 That Act basically requires all holding
companies which own 25 percent or more of the stock of two or more
commercial banks to register with the Federal Reserve Board. (This
explains why one-bank holding companies are often referred to as
"unregistered" bank holding companies.) Thus, if a company owns all
of the stock of only one bank or less than 25 percent in each of several
banks, it is exempt from registration. This is true even though the
company has effective control over these banks through closely
affiliated corporations, through multi-bank stock holdings of its
directors, or through its trust investments.
Registration with the Federal Reserve Board carries with it several
7. Some changes are clearly desirable. For example, we have needlessly specialized
consumer and mortgage lending, savings institutions, etc., which leads to undesirable specific
monetary controls, such as those of Regulation Q. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.0-.6 (1969). In addition,
dual state and federal bank regulation is archaic and leads to undesirable differences in states'
banking structures; and at the federal level, the division of supervisory authority results in
unnecessary dissension.
8. Senator Proxmire's proposed bill on one-bank holding companies does contain a
provision for a complete study of the banking structure. S. 1052, 9 Ist Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1964).
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disadvantages: (1) the holding.company must divest itself of control of
all non-banking and non-bank-related corporations; (2) the holding
company must file annual reports and submit to examination by the
Federal Reserve Board; and (3) all acquisitions of more than five
percent of the stock of additional banks must be approved by the
Federal Reserve Board. 0 Unregistered bank holding companies, on the
other hand, can engage in non-banking business, need not submit to
examination or file an annual report with the Federal Reserve Board,
and can merge without approval of the Board. Nevertheless, it is still
true that all banks, whether or not subsidiaries of a holding company,
must submit to examination by at least one bank supervisory agency,
such as the State Banking Commission or the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. This examination, however, is limited to the
operations of the bank and does not encompass the operations of the
entire holding company. In addition, all bank aquisitions are subject
to the usual antitrust laws. Thus, the most important difference
between registered and unregistered holding companies is the power
which unregistered companies have to engage in non-banking activities
and to own. non-bank-related corporations.
Unregistered bank holding companies have not allowed this
privileg& to go unused. As of September 1, 1968, unregistered holding
companies owned real estate companies, finance companies,' all types
of insurance companies, savings and loan associations, and even a few
farms and grocery stores." A particularly surprising statistic is that
397 one-bank holding companies are engaged in 9 different nonfinancial activities. 2 While one-bank holding companies have
manifestly restricted themselves to financial activities, the facts betray
a definite interest in non-financial activities. In summary, one-bank
holding companies are largely unregulated and totally unrestricted as
to the kinds of business they may pursue.
B.

The Struggle to Diversify

The widespread organization of one-bank holding companies is the
newest effort by banks to diversify their operations; it follows a long
series of prior and unsuccessful attempts. Previously, banks attempted
to expand into non-banking activities by broadly interpreting the
"incidental powers" clause, which forms the heart of the basic
10. The Federal Reserve Board has exclusive supervisory authority over registered bank
holding companies, whether the banks involved are state or national, insured or uninsured.
I1. BANKING AND CURRENCY PRINT. supra note I, at 49-51.
12. Id.
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legislation from which banks derive their powers. The National Bank
Act sets forth the basic powers of national banks:
To exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents,
subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills
of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and
selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and
by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of this
chapter. 3

Beginning in the early sixties, banks began to construe the
"incidental powers" clause as permitting them to expand their

activities directly into such related activities as life insurance, travel
services, commingled trust accounts, data processing services, credit

cards, armored car services, and direct leasing. In addition, through
wholly-owned subsidiaries, they engaged in mortgage servicing,

factoring, credit reporting, warehousing, etc. Most importantly, their
efforts were supported by the Comptroller of the Currency, James
Saxon, who also interpreted the "incidental powers" clause in a liberal

manner. In a letter on the subject of national banks acting as insurance
agents, Saxon said:
Congress has consistently recognized that the business of banking covers a
wide range of activities. In the National Bank Act of 1864, Congress wisely
refused to define the business of banking as it then existed, foreseeing that the
banking business would change and develop with the passing years. It is clear that
the business of banking is advanced by financial and related services, and powers
necessary to achieve and promote the fundamental purposes of banking must be
regarded as powers incidental to those expressly granted by paragraph seven of
12 U.S.C. 24.11

Even Saxon, however, clearly recognized that the law prohibited banks
from engaging in a nonrelated, non-banking business. In a letter on the

subject of banks providing travel services, he said:
Traditionally, national banks have been excluded from direct participation in
the production of raw material, manufacturing, or commerce, so as to immunize
the banking system from the risks inherent in the employment of venture capital.
Subject to this restriction, however, it is clear that the business of banking is the
furthering by financial and related services of commerce and industry and the
convenience of the public. Powers necessary to achieve the fundamental purposes
of banking must be regarded as powers incidental to those expressly granted. 5

Comptroller Saxon nevertheless permitted national banks to provide
travel services based on the broad theory that travel services are related
to the banks' overall financial services.
13.

12 U.S.C. § 24, para. 7 (1964) (emphasis added).

14. Letter from Rep. Phil M. Landrum, May 7, 1965.
15. Letter from Rep. Edward J. Gurney, October 26, 1964 (emphasis added).

1280

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 22

Industry representatives in those lines of commerce threatened by
bank competition struck back through the courts. One after another
they filed suit to enjoin banks from providing the newly authorized
services, arguing that defendant-banks lacked statutory authority to
offer such services (or that banks were engaging in ultra vires acts). In
Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon,"5 plaintiff sought and obtained an
injunction prohibiting banks from underwriting and dealing in
obligations of states or political subdivisions not secured by the general
power of taxation; while in Georgia Ass'n. of Independent Insurance
Agents, Inc. v. Saxon, 7 banks were prohibited from acting as agents for
the issuance of insurance in connection with loan transactions in any
location where the population exceeds 5,000 inhabitants. More recently,
in Dickinson v. First National Bank,18 banks were prevented from
establishing armored car services, or any off-premises activities which
could be construed as contrary to states' branch banking statutes.Y0
Banks have, however, made some gains as well, although some of
these gains may be temporary. In Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,2' for
example, the district court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to
challenge the right of a national bank to operate a travel agency and
dismissed the suit. In Wingate Corp. v. Industrial National Bank" and
2
Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp, 1
plaintiffs were also unsuccessful in obtainifig an injunction in the
district court preventing national banks from providing electronic data
processing services. In the Wingate case, however, the First Circuit
reversed, finding that plaintiff had standing to sue under the Bank
Service Corporation Act. 23 Very recently, in Investment Compan'
Institute v. Caip,4 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ruled that banks could operate commingled investment accounts, or
mutual funds.
An important point in all of these decisions, especially those won
by the banks, is that in no case did the court rest its decision on section
24 of the National Bank Act, which avoided the complex problem of
defining the incidental powers of commercial banks. The above named
16. 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966).
17. 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), affd, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
18. 400 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1968).
19. See also Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P.2d. 786 (1963).
20. 286 F. Supp. 770 (D.Mass. 1968). affd, 408 F.2d 1147 (Ist Cir. 1969).
21. 288 F. Supp. 49 (D.R.I. 1968), rev'd, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969).
22. 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968), aJfd, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969). cert. granted,
U.S. - (No. 1246, June 23, 1969).
23. 408 F.2d 1147 (Ist Cir. 1969).
24. Civil No. 21,662 (D.C. Cir. June I, 1969).
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cases were resolved on the basis of entirely different statutes or on
technical grounds such as the lack of plaintiff's standing to sue.
Whether the courts will eventually be forced to tackle the difficult issue
of what powers are incidental to banking remains to be seen. Much will
depend on whether Congress again ducks a question which is properly
within its province. '
Hemmed in against direct expansion by a multitude of regulations
and restrictive court decisions, banks turned to the holding company
scheme, an old but little used device. The recent trend toward one-bank
holding companies, therefore, can be partially explained by the
frustration banks have encountered in pursuing their persistent 'desire
to diversify. There remains, however, the fundamental question of why
banks wish to diversify.
C.

The ReasonsJbrDiversificaton

Since 1900 commercial banking as an industry has been declining
in relative importance. Savings institutions, consumer lenders, and a
host of other financial institutions have slowly but persistently made
inroads on commercial banks. Table I below shows that commercial
bank assets, considered from several points of view, have grown less
rapidly than those of competing financial institutions.2 1 In 1900
commercial banks held more than three-fifths of all assets retained by
financial intermediaries, but by 1965 their share had declined to
roughly one-third.
TABLE I
Commercial bank assets
as percentage of
assets of all financial
intermediaries

Commercial bank assets
as a percentage of
assets of only
private financial
intermediaries

Commercial bank
assets as a
percentage
of GNP

1900
1912
1922

62.5
64.5
59.1

62.5
64.5
65.0

53.8
60.7
65.2

1929

49.8

53.6

63.4

1933

41.6

48.5

82.3

1939
1945
1949
1952
1958

40.0
46.1
40.2
38.8
34.2

52.2
63.0
54.5
51.8
43.6

72.8
75.1
61.7
54.8
54.3

1965
25.

31.7

38.3

52.3

For a possible interpretation of the incidental powers clause, see Beatty, The Incidental
Powers of National Banks, 4 NAT'L BANKING Riy. 263 (1967); Huck, What is the Banking
Business?. 83 BANKING L.J. 491 (1966).
26. Burns, The Relative Decline of ('onintercial Banks: A .Vote, 77 J. POL. [:coN. 122-28
(1969).
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This decline may be due to a lack of aggressiveness on the part
of commercial banks, but this factor alone is not a complete
explanation. At the turn of this century commercial banking consisted
primarily of accepting short-term liabilities (demand deposits) and
extending short-term business credit. In 1900 savings deposits
constituted less than one-sixth of total commercial bank deposits, and
the loan-to-deposit ratio was roughly 50 percent. In fact, nearly 25
percent of banks' assets were "cash assets. 21 Since that time, savings
and time deposits have continually risen to today's level of almost 60
percent of total deposits, banks have increased their loan-to-deposit
ratios to roughly 60 percent, and have moved increasingly into longerterm lending28
The drift of commercial banking away from demand deposits and
short-term assets and into longer-term liabilities and assets is partially
the result of changing customer tastes, partially a response to a
changing economy, and partially the result of regulation. In 1946 bank
customers held 50 cents in currency and demand deposits for each
dollar of gross national product; today they hold less than 25 cents.
This sharp change is the result of the following factors: (1) Growing
confidence in the stability of our economic and financial system which
reduces the need for liquidity; (2) improved credit arrangements, such
as credit cards, available to large segements of the population which
lessen the need for carrying large liquid balances; (3) the prohibition
against banks' paying interest on demand deposits which encourages
customers to switch from demand deposits to income-yielding assets;
and (4) the increasingly attractive yields on substitute liquid assets,
such as savings deposits, which have induced customers to shift funds
from demand deposits to time and savings deposits.
As a larger proportion of banks' liabilities have taken the form
of interest-bearing savings and time deposits, bank costs have increased
commensurately, forcing banks to raise their loan-to-deposit ratios and
to search for higher yielding assets in order to maintain acceptable
profit levels. Although bank earnings (net current operating revenue)
as a percent of total capital have not declined substantially during the
1950's and 1960's (ranging from 18.5 percent to about 14.5 percent),20
during the last few years bankers began to fear that they could no
longer offset increasing costs by further increases in their already high
27. U.S. BD. OF Gov. OF FED. RES. Sys., ALL-BANK STATISTICS, UNITED STATES 18961955, at 34-36 (1959).
28. 55 FED. RES. BULL. A 19-25 (March 1969).
29. FDIC ANN. REPORTS (1952-1967).
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loan-to-deposit ratios. Consequently, they began looking for alternative
sources of earnings, either higher yielding assets or entirely new lines
of business. Thus, slow relative growth and increasing costs combined
to push bankers into attempting to diversify the scope of their
operations, at first directly under a permissive comptroller of the
currency, and then later through the device of the one-bank holding
company3
The message of this discussion is clear: the one-bank holding
company movement is not a sudden, unexpected, and whimsical
phenomenon, but is the predictable consequence of real economic
problems. As such, it demands thoughtful consideration. The
remainder of this paper is devoted to an analysis and evaluation of the
economic implications of one-bank holding companies.

III.

THE

ECONOMIC

CONSEQUENCES

OF

ONE-BANK

HOLDING

COMPANIES

The potential economic effects of one-bank holding companies are
separated for convenience of discussion into the following issues: (1)
The effect on competition-is competition likely to increase or decrease
as a result of the proliferation of one-bank holding companies? (2) The
effect on economic efficiency-will the affiliation of different
enterprises result in internal cost savings or economies of scale? (3) The
effect on bank solvency and depositor safety-will the affiliation of
banks with non-banking businesses lead to unsound financial
transactions or excessive risk-taking? (4) The effect on monetary
policy-since commercial banks are the primary institution through
which the Federal Reserve implements monetary policy, will structural
changes in banking affect the success and efficiency of monetary
policy?
A.

Competition

Since all one-bank holding companies are conglomerates to some
degree, the competitive issues they raise are in general similar to those
raised by most conglomerates. In his thorough analysis of
conglomerate mergers, Professor Donald Turner analyzes four major
30. Another way of viewing the diversification trend may be in terms of a non-price
competition theory. If banking markets can be considered close-knit oligopolies so that open price
competition is not feasible, perhaps because of a "kinked" demand curve, banks would choose
to compete on non-price terms. Further, the extensive regulation of banking activities may inhibit
even non-price competition, so that banks may aggressively seek new ways to compete; and one
way is to offer customers a greater variety of services than that offered by competitors. The slow
growth and profitability theories discussed in the text can be made compatible with this approach.
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possibilities of how conglomerates may adversly affect competition:3'

(I) Existing firms may restrain their competitive efforts out of fear of
invoking massive retailiation (such as predatory pricing) by
competitors associated

with large and financially powerful

conglomerates. (2) The mere size and financial strength of firms
affiliated with conglomerates may significantly deter entry. (3)
Permitting entry through acquisition by a conglomerate rather than
through the establishment of a new enterprise may eliminate important

potential competition. (4) Affiliates of conglomerates may develop
reciprocity agreements and tying arrangements among themselves.
Professor Turner' draws the following conclusions with respect to
these issues.
1. (a) Predatory or unfair pricing by conglomerates in order to achieve monoply
does not appear to be of significant concern.
(b) A disproportionately large conglomerate which enters an industry by
acquisition islikely to restrain the competitive behavior of smaller rivals only in
those industries where there has been vigorous competition and the number of
competing firms are few enough that the identity and nature of competitors is a
significant aspect. Even here, however, the effect may be pro-competitive if there
are substantial economies of scale.
2. There is no reason to believe that conglomerates have a preponderately
adverse effect upon new entry; in fact, since conglomerates may be able to enter
with greater ease than smaller firms, they may stimulate competition.
3. There is no reason to believe that conglomerate acquisitions will, in general,
significantly lessen potential competition; and in those instances where this does
happen, present antitrust laws are adequate to prevent it.3
4. Reciprocity agreements and tying arrangements, especially of an informal
nature, are likely to have the most serious adverse competitive effects, but
Professor Turner recommends that "a conglomerate merger should not be
outlawed . . . unless at least fifteen or twenty percent of a market is made subject
to foreclosure."'

Accepting Professor Turner's conclusions as the best available
judgment on the competitive effects of conglomerates, the question

remains whether these conclusions are equally applicable to one-bank
holding companies. One-bank holding companies are unique in the
sense that they include banks among their affiliates, unlike the typical
conglomerate.

With respect to predatory or unfair pricing, one-bank holding
companies do not appear to be any greater threat than the typical
31. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv.
1313 (1965).
32. Id. at 1352, 1354-58, 1391.
33. Cf.United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
34. Turner, supra note 31, at 1391.
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conglomerate, and for the same reasons advanced by Turner: it is
unlikely to be very profitable and it is an obvious violation of section
2 of the Sherman Act. With respect to the general effect on.smaller
rivals, however, it is possible that the inclusion of a bank may result
in greater competitive restraint, since most small competitors are very
dependent on banks foi credit. To take an extreme example, envision
a small town with two banks each of which decide to form a holding
company and acquire household appliance firms. If there are three
appliance stores in town, the third (independent) store will clearly be
in an unenviable position. Since he is dependent on the banks for credit,
the last thing he wishes to do is' strain relations with the banks 'by
competing "too" vigorously with their affiliated appliance stores. He
might, therefore, voluntarily restrain his competitive behavior. The
seriousness of this effect depends upon the degree to which the
unaffiliated appliance store is dependent on local banks for credit, the
number of local banks, the degree of banking competition, and the
exact nature of the bank holding companies. For example, if banks in
the community do not all have affiliates in the same lines of commerce,
independent firms should not feel any competitive restraint, since they
can always turn to a disinterested bank for credit. Thus, in some
circumstances, one-bank holding companies will restrain the
competitive behavior of smaller rivals, while in other circumstances
they will have no impact. The obvious policy implication is that
acquisitions by one-bank holding companies should not be left
completely free, but should be subject to the approval of a regulatory
agency which can properly evaluate its likely competitive impact.
With respect to Professor Turner's conclusions on the entry effect,
one-bank holding companies are even more likely to have a net procompetitive effect than the typical conglomerate. The effect may occur
in two ways: Banks may enter non-banking industries and non-banking
businesses may enter banking. Banks in particular would be a
substantial entry threat. Since they have as their customers firms from
many industries, they are privy to information about costs and profits
in these industries, and therefore likely to attempt entry into those
industries where it is needed most-high profit, monopolistic industries.
Possession of reliable information of this sort, moreover, lessens the
risk of attempting entry. In addition to those industries having high
entry barriers due to high absolute capital requirements or great
promotional costs,3 banks represent a great threat because of their easy
35. See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEw COMPETITION 142-43 (1956); Comanor & Wilson,
Advertising, Market Structureand Performance,49 REv. OF ECON. AND STATICS 423 (1967).
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access to capital and their high quality names which can be transferred
to other products. The recent entry of banks into equipment leasing and
credit cards are examples of this ability.3 Despite these advantages, of
course, banks may still not have easy access to certain financial
industries, since there are additional entry barriers in the form of
governmental licensing requirements. Even here, however, it seems very
reasonable to conclude that banks will be a substantial entry threat,
since if any potential entrants can meet the public interest tests of
regulators, banks are the most likely to meet them-banks are wellestablished, profitable businesses with financial management of proven
ability and high integrity.
With respect to entry into banking itself, one-bank holding
companies open the door to the entry of large, established firms, which
have ready access to financial capital and possess management of
proven ability. Once again, the degree to which these firms will pose
an entry threat depends upon the "licensing" attitude of bank
regulators, but whatever their immediate attitude may be, bank
regulators will certainly be forced eventually to give these potentially
strong entrants careful consideration. It is clear, in fact, that banks
themselves appreciate the significance of this threat. Within a few
months of the attempted take-over of the Chemical Bank of New York
by Leasco Data Corporation, banks quietly pushed through the New
York State legislature a bill that requires the New York State Banking
Superintendent to approve all acquisitions of State banks by non-bank
companies,3"7 which by increasing the uncertainty and risk in acquiring
a bank tends to discourage entry into banking by non-banking
companies. State legislation of this type, however, cannot succeed
alone. If federal legislation makes entry easy through the acquisition
of national banks, such state legislation will become largely ineffectual.
Professor Turner's fourth conclusion-that conglomerates will not
lessen potential competition-is equally valid for one-bank holding
companies.. In fact, on the basis of the preceding arguments that onebank holding companies will increase competition through greater
actual entry, we might conclude that competition will also be improved
by increasing the threat of potential entry; if, on the other hand,
36. Although banks are presently doing leasing directly, an adverse outcome of pending
litigation may force them to resort to the holding company device. It is also interesting to note
that it took an antitrust suit by the Justice Department to induce de novo entry into credit cards.
37. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1969, at 68, col. 3.
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acquisitions by banks or one-bank holding companies tended to lessen
potential competition, present antitrust laws could be used to prohibit
such acquisitions:Reciprocity agreements and tying arrangements among holding
company affiliates are of greater concern. Professor Turner says:
' " * informal reciprocity pressures through a conglomerate company's
salesmen, whether sanctioned or not, are probably not only common but
extraordinarily hard to detect, and they are likely to persist whenever the market
structure is conducive to them. More important is the problem that even .in the
absence of formal or informal pressure, there is a strong liklihood, which
increases with the stakes, that at least some producer "inthe middle" will
voluntarily favor the conglomerate firm with their purchases in the hope of
substantially increasing their own sales. It would be wholly unreasonable, even if
possible, to prohibit such behavior; it can be eliminated only by forestalling the
creation of the conglomerate structure that fosters it09

As an example of the tie-in problem, suppose that a large bank
forms a holding company and acquires a fire and casualty insurance
company. If the bank is in a strong position vis-a-vis its business
customers, or they are dependent on the bank for their credit needs,
the bank could force its customers to buy insurance from its insurance
affiliate, perhaps even at a price above market. An example of
reciprocity is the following: suppose a bank combines with a large
chain of supermarkets to form a holding company. Many producers
of items such as foodstuff and dairy products will be in the middle.
They use bank credit as well as sell their produce to supermarkets. If
these firms covet the opportunity to sell their produce to the
supermarket chain, they may "voluntarily" use the services of the bank
to curry the favor of the supermarket affiliates.
In what circumstances are one bank holding companies likely to
use these devices and when do they pose a serious threat to
competition? Although present antitrust laws prohibit most tie-in sales
and reciprocity arrangements," ° these laws are unlikely to be very
effective against informal or voluntary arrangements. The real
question, therefore, is what kinds of market structure conditions tend
to foster the use of these devices and how do we prevent these
conditions from developing.
See Edwards, Bank Mergers and the Public Interest:A Legal and Economic Analysis
Banking Act, 85 BANKING L.J. 753 (1968).
39. Turner, supra note 31, at 1390.
40. I TC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. I (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United
States v. Investors Diversified Services, 102 F.'Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 195 1). Although there is some
question about whether Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964) applies to "service" tie-ins, the
Sherman Act § I, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) is clearly applicable.
38.

oj the 1966
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Generally speaking, tie-in sales and reciprocity arrangements are
not considered to be a serious competitive problem unless: (1) a seller
is either the sole seller or a very important seller of a product and can
use this power to foreclose additional markets to competitors, and (2)
the buyer or distributor affiliate of the holding company in a
reciprocity arrangement is a substantial and important buyer or
distributor of the "middleman's" product. In other words, for a tie-in
sale to harm competition, the seller must possess some monopoly
power over the tying product which can be used as a lever to impose a
tying arrangement in order to foreclose the tied-product market. But
even in cases where the seller does possess this monopoly power, his
success in foreclosing competition will also depend upon the degree to
which consumers of the tied-product also use the tying product and the
difficulty of new entry into the tied-product market (which will depend
on the magnitude of economies of scale in producing the tied product,
the minimum efficient plant size, etc.)." In a similar fashion, the
impact of a reciprocity arrangement on competition will depend upon
the importance or size of the bank's buyer or distributor affiliate
(supermarket). If the buyer or distributor affiliate is small and
unimportant, it is improbable that customers of the bank will be willing
to buy an unattractive product in order to gain the privilege of selling
their own products to the bank's buyer affiliate.
What are the implications for one-bank holding companies?
Assuming that the antitrust laws are inadequate to prevent the
voluntary type of arrangement, is there any policy short of a complete
prohibition of one-bank holding companies which can successfully cope
with this problem? Since the successful use of tie-in sales and
reciprocity arrangements depends critically upon the structural
conditions of the market, much of their potential anticompetitive
impact can be avoided by controlling the market structure. For
example, to curb reciprocity arrangements, banks could be prevented
from acquiring a sizable buyer affiliate in any market, or vice versa;
and if an affiliate in time grew to become a substantial firm, it might
be necessary to require divestiture. To alleviate the tie-in problem,
authorities could prohibit the acquisition of firms operating in markets
particularly vulnerable to foreclosure-markets with high entry
barriers where the users of the product are also heavy users of bank
credit. Again, it is conceivable that at some point divestiture may
become necessary.
41.

See Edwards, Tie-In Sales in Banking and One Bank Holding Companies, to appcar

shortly in ANTITRUST
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It is obvious that a structural policy along these lines would
require giving substantial discretionary power to banking regulatory
authorities to regulate acquisitions and affiliate relationships. Further,
developing clear and specific guidelines will not be easy. Nevertheless
the alternatives are not terribly attractive: a complete prohibition of
one-bank holding companies or total freedom for holding companies
to acquire affiliates. Giving discretionary power to regulatory
authorities is at least consistent with our present policy. Authorities
now approve bank acquisitions only if they are in the public interest.
Extending these powers to one-bank holding companies seems only
natural.
With respect to the issue of competition, we have seen that in some
circumstances one-bank holding companies may increase competition,
while in others competition may be diminished. The issue is far from
clear-cut. If one-bank holding companies are prohibited altogether, we
lose the benefits of increased competition. In addition, it is clear that
one-bank holding companies should be subject to acquisition guidelines
designed to prevent acquisitions of the kind associated with either the
undesirable tying and reciprocity arrangements or with the suppression
of smaller competitors. What is not clear, of course, is whether it is
possible to formulate acquisition guidelines adequate to control these
undesirable practices, or whether no policy short of a complete
prohibition is adequate. In part, the desirability of trying to devise such
guidelines, rather than accepting an outright prohibition of one-bank
holding companies, must rest on an evaluation of the total economic
benefit associated with one-bank holding companies, both of a
competitive and a noncompetitive nature.
B.

Economic Efficiency

Assuming that one-bank holding companies do on balance
diminish competition, it is possible that they could still .be beneficial
in a public interest sense. If, for example, the affiliation of two
independent firms yields both substantial economies of scale and
diminishes competition, the net allocative (welfare) effect may still be
positive ; 2 Figure 1 demonstrates this possibility. The horizontal line
Ac i is the level of average costs before the merger, Ac 2 the level of
42. The achievement of economies of scale need not necessitate a reduction in competition.
For example, lower costs might stimulate greater entry or put added pressures on other firms to

imorove their performance.
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average costs after the merger, P, the price before the merger, and P2
the price after the merger. P2 exceeds PI since it is assumed that the
merger diminishes competition. The net allocative effect of the merger
p

Dead Weight Loss

A1

2

Ac1

1

I

I
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Cost Savings = A2

is the difference between the two areas represented by A, and A2 (A2
minus A1 ). The area A, is the loss in consumers' surplus due to a rise
in price to P2 and a fall in output to Q2 ; or, it is a measure of the
welfare loss to consumers. The area A2 represents the cost savings
involved in producing output Q2 compared to what it would have cost
to produce Q2 prior to the merger; or, A2 is the welfare gain to the
producer. If A2 exceeds A , the merger yields a net welfare gain."
The decision to prohibit one-bank holding companies because they
may possibly reduce competition, therefore, must in part turn on an
evaluation of the extent to which possible cost savings may outweigh
possible adverse competitive effects. To make this determination, some
idea of the respective magnitudes is necessary. It is important to
recognize, of course, that the adverse effects of a reduction in
competition are not confined solely to the allocative effects, but
43. See Williamson, Economics as an Antitrusi Dejense: The Weljare Tradeoljs, 58 A%1,
EcON. Rav. 18 (1968).
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probably extend to effects on technological progress, managerial
discretion, etc.44 The relevant test is the net welfare impact of all of
these factors. The following discussion attempts to evaluate the
probable magnitude and importance of the effect of each of these
factors .

A merger or affiliation may yield efficiencies if it results in
economies of scale in production, distribution, research, selling,
management, or capital costs. With respect to "pure" conglomerate
affiliations (affiliations between firms producing entirely unrelated
products), most economists would undoubtedly agree with the
following statement:
Economies of scale involve common supply or demand factors-products that can
be produced with the same facilities, or sold to the same customers through the
same distribution channels, or for which research and development in the two or
more lines can be pooled. Since a "pure" conglomerate merger produces few
economic interrelations between the products of the acquiring and the acquired
firm, the possibility of significant economies is slight. A "pure" conglomerate
merger may, however, yield economies in management services (accounting, legal
advice, engineering, repairs, etc.), or in advertising expenditures, or in capital costs
even though the products involved have no other common supply or demand
relationships. Moreover, it is possible with any kind of conglomerate merger that
the acquired firm will subsequently be run more efficiently than before simply
because the new management is more capable than the one replaced. But the latter
kind of improvement seems less likely when the difference between the lines of
products of the two firms is great. . . . Also, advertising economies seem less
likely to follow the "pure" conglomerate: different media and different appeals
are commonly needed for products bought by quite different classes of customers,
and the appeal of a strong trademark is more readily transferable to similar
products . . . than to widely different ones . . . . Insofar as the likelihood of
economies of scale in capital costs is concerned, however, there seems little basis
for distinguishing among various kinds of conglomerate mergers: size alone is an
important factor in the ability to attract cheap capital, and it is quite possible that
"pure" conglomerates, by diversifying risks, may obtain capital as cheaply or
more cheaply than a comparably sized conglomerate producing closely related
lines.R

Put in the context of one-bank holding companies, these general
conclusions would refer to affiliations between banks and nonfinancial
enterprises, since affiliations of banks with other financial institutions
is clearly not analogous to the "'pure" conglomerate case. Many
financial institutions provide products similar to those offered by
44. Id. at 29-32; Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency' versus 'x-efficiency," 56 Am. EcON.
REv. 392 (1966).
45. Depending upon our exact social welfare function, we may choose to assign varying
degrees of importance to each of these effects. For example, one income distribution may be preferred to another, or small firms may be preferred to large firms.
46. Turner, supra note 31. at 1330-31.
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commercial banks: savings institutions offer almost identical savings
deposits and make similar kinds of mortgage loans; consumer loan
companies extend consumer credit not very different from that
extended by banks; life insurance companies provide business credit
equivalent to commercial bank term loans; and several of these
institutions manage portfolios of government bonds, commercial paper,
corporate bonds, and common stock, just as commercial banks do (the
latter as trust accounts). Thus, although rather insubstantial
efficiencies might be expected from affiliations of banks with nonfinancial businesses, the likelihood of achieving economies is much
greater when banks are joined with other financial institutions, since
the economic interrelationships among the products of banks and
financial institutions are much greater.
What kinds of economies are "financial" conglomerates (banks
affiliated only with financial institutions) likely to yield? First, there are
likely to be some economies of scale in production. Improvements in
data processing are rapidly changing the technology used to produce
financial services. Today, for example, many instutions have
completely automated their accounting and bookkeeping systems. It
is true,,of course, that these technological advances may be achieved
in ways other than through the formation of one-bank holding
companies. For example, financial institutions might achieve the same
economies through horizontal merger, internal growth, or by using the
facilities of data processing service bureaus. None of these alternatives,
however, are considered to be good substitutes. Antitrust laws and
restrictive branching laws greatly limit growth by horizontal merger,47
and achieving economies through internal growth may take an
exorbitantly long time. Using a service bureau is the most promising
alternative, although lack of in-house skilled personnel and the
difficulty of tailoring the service bureau's product to the unique
requirements of a particular institution are not insignificant problems.
In the absence of more concrete evidence, therefore, it is probably
reasonable to conclude that one-bank holding companies do yield
economies of production through the use of greater automation,
although it would seem imprudent to assign a heavy weight to this gain.
Second, there may be economies in distribution. For example, the
affiliation of a bank which operates a large branching system with an
47. See Edwards, Bank Mergers and the Public Interest: A Legal and Econonic Analysis
of the 1966 Bank Merger Act, 85 BANKING L.J. 753 (1968). Many financial institutions, however,
such as savings institutions, have not been restricted by the antitrust laws.
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insurance company may enable the consolidated company to use the
branch offices as distribution centers for its insurance. Third, there
may be economies in selling for some of the same reasons. In the
previous example, for instance, the insurance salesmen might also be
used to sell the bank's services-trust services, savings accounts, estate
planning, etc. The magnitude of such economies will obviously depend
on the degree to which the products are related, or the ease with which
the same salesmen or offices can be used. Although there are
substantial similarites between many different financial services, there
are also important distinctions, so that any conclusion is at best
speculative. Nevertheless, there are probably some selling and
distribution economies.
Economies in research and associated product development may
be the most important gain accruing to one-bank holding companies.
Important gains in research may come in several ways: (1) many
financial institutions manage similar portfolios so that common
research personnel can be utilized-portfolios of common stock,
government bonds, corporate bonds, etc.; and (2) since many financial
institutions have common management problems, research can be
directed towards developing new management techniques beneficial to
all of the institutions. 48 In addition, permitting different types of
financial institutions to combine may stimulate research towards
developing new products which utilize combinations of different
financial services. Examples may be the development of comprehensive
financial planning for individuals and businesses. At present, little
effort is being made in this direction because no single financial
institution is capable of providing all of the necessary services. To the
extent that better products are developed or existing services are
combined to create more convenient or cheaper products, the public
interest is benefited.
Fourth, there are likely to be economies of promotion and capital
costs. Since promotional economies stem from the similarity among
products, they too are most likely in the case of financial
conglomerates. Even in these cases, however, the distinction between
the products is probably too great to yield substantial promotional
economies. Selling life insurance, for example, is quite different than
selling consumer loans. But holding companies may also reap
promotional benefits from their large size by being able to get quantity
48.

For examples of such techniques, see K. COHEN & F.

IN BANKING (1966).
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discounts in the purchase of advertising time or space or by being able
to use more efficient promotional techniques, such as television instead
of radio. In addition, there may be promotional economies in
transferring goodwill or an established trademark to new products.
Economies in capital costs would seem as likely or unlikely in the case
of the "pure" conglomerate as in the case of the financial
conglomerate. Size, more than any other factor, determines economies
in capital costs, so that the combining of financial institutions with
non-financial institutions is irrelevant to this issue. Judging the
magnitude of such economies, of course, is impossible.
Lastly, economies in management are likely. Large holding
companies are more successful in attracting young management talent
of high quality, partly because of the additional prestige and partly
because of the higher possible return to the employee. Higher quality
management is believed to raise efficiency more than that
commensurate with the increase in labor costs due to employing
superior talent. In addition, the management skills utilized by most
financial institutions are so similar that there should be easy
transferability of management abilities among affiliates of financial
conglomerates, although not among affiliates of a "pure"
conglomerate. These economies may be significant in the long-run.
What conclusions, if any, can we draw from all these observations
on economic efficiency? First, and most striking, there is an absolute
dearth of hard facts and figures upon which to base conclusions about
the economic efficiences associated with one-bank holding companies;
and, second, these observations support the notion that the efficiencies
associated with "financial" conglomerates are much greater than those
associated with "pure" conglomerates. Financial conglomerates may
achieve important efficiencies in research, product development, and
management, and lesser economies in production, selling, distribution,
and promotion, while economies in capital costs accrue to both kinds
of conglomerates.
C.

The Saftty and Solvency of Banks

Determining the correct policy to adopt towards mergers and
acquisition is normally a problem of evaluating the economic costs and
benefits from increases or decreases in competition and economic
efficiency. When financial institutions, especially commercial banks,
are involved, there are additional considerations: those of solvency and
monetary policy.
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Unlike most industries, the solvency of the banking system is an
important public interest concern. Without a financial system which
instills complete confidence, our complex and sophisticated economy
might collapse, or at least function in a far less efficient way. Although
few would quarrel with solvency as a basic objective, reasonable men
often differ over exactly what increases or decreases financial safety
and solvency, and it is this difference of opinion that permeates the onebank holding company controversy. This section examines the potential
effects which one-bank holding companies may have on financial
solvency. The other important consideration-that of monetary
policy-is discussed in the section following. There, as in this section,
we shall see that. one-bank holding companies raise unique issues due
to the involvement of commercial banks.
Historically, the idea that banks should be kept separate from
more speculative financial activities led to extensive regulation and
limitation of banks' activities. For example, the 1933 Glass-Steagall
Act'9 required the complete separation of commercial banking from the
securities business on the theory that the collapse of the banking system
in the 1930's was due largely to bank involvement in speculative
activities. "'l More recently, Representative Patman, a leader in the fight
to curb holding companies, has echoed these sentiments: "In the wake
of the great stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent great
depression, Congress, in its wisdom, decided that commercial banking
should be divorced from all other activities." 15 1 In addition; Governors
Martin and Robertson of the Federal Reserve Board have called for
the separation of banking from "business wholly unrelated to
banking.""2 Implicit in all of these statements is the notion that
combining banking with non-banking businesses somehow leads to a
situation which undermines the soundness of the financial system.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1964).
50. On the problems of a bank owning a securities affiliate, the Comptroller of the
Currency in 1920 said: "[1l]t would be difficult, if not impossible, for the same set of officers to
conduct safely, soundly, and successfully the conservative business of the national bank and at
the same time direct and manage the speculative ventures and promotions of the ancillary
institutions." Hearings Before a Subconmm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 7 Ist
Cong., 2d Sess. 1067-68 (1931). See also REPORT OF THE Co.XiM. APPOINTED PURSUANT TO H.R.
429 AND H.R. 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT,

pt. 2,55-106 (1913).
51. 115 CONG. REC. 902 (1969).
52. See the joint statement of Govenors Martin and Robertson of the Federal Reserve
Board in the Hearings Before the Subconum. of the Senate Conn. on Banking and Currency,

84th Cong., Ist
Sess. 44 (1955). "We believe ... that the principal problems in the bank holding
company field arise from . . .the combination under single control of both banking and non-
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There are two aspects of one-bank holding companies which, if left
unchecked, may undermine solvency. First, the corporate structure may
be such that the failure of one affiliate will bring down all of the
affiliates. This might happen if the assets of all affiliates were liable to
the creditors of any one affiliate, or the intracorporate financial
transactions among affiliates were such as to make the bank's solvency
dependent upon the solvency of other affiliates. Second, the equity
structure of the various affiliates may encourage the practice of
shuffling assets among affiliates in a way which conceivably could
increase the risk of bankruptcy to the bank affiliate.
Both of these possibilities can be corrected by regulation. For
example, the vulnerability of a bank affiliate can be substantially
lessened by regulation which requires the separate incorporation of
each affiliate and which severely restricts intracorporate transactions.
The requirement of separate incorporation prevents the creditors of a
bankrupt affiliate from attacking any other solvent affiliate, while
restrictions on intracorporate transactions may prevent the bank from
getting into trouble directly. (All one-bank holding companies thus far
have pursued a policy of separate incorporation.) National banks, of
course, are already subject to regulations which prohibit them from
lending more than ten percent of their resources to any one affiliate or
more than twenty percent to all affiliates, 3 but it is probably naive to
think that any regulation can be so all-inclusive and so expertly drawn
as to eliminate every possibility of undesirable intracorporate dealing.
Chairman Martin of the Federal Reserve Board has recently noted that
loans to the customers of the holding company's affiliates are not
subject to regulation,54 and therefore bank affiliates may very well come
under pressure to favor financially unsound customers of affiliates.
This problem, however, is only one aspect of a much larger
problem-that of asset shuffling.
banking enterprises, thus permitting departure from the principle that banking institutions should
not engage in business wholly unrelated to banking, which involves the lending of other people's
money, whereas other types of business enterprise do not involve this element of trusteeship." See
also Chairman Martin's recent testimony in Hearings on H.R. 6778 and H.R. 9385 before House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
53. 12U.S.C.§ 371c (1964).
54. "A bank should be insulated from pressures that might lead it to favor customers of

affiliated businesses in its credit decisions. Otherwise, the bank might build an unbalanced loan
portfolio by discounting an excessive amount of obligations of such customers or a low-quality
portfolio by accepting substandard risks to foster sales to such customers." Hearings on H.R.
6778 and H.R. 9385 Before House Comnm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., IstSess.
(1969).
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The following example demonstrates the dangers that asset
shuffling presents to banks' solvency. Moreover, it shows that the
severity of the practice will depend upon the equity structure of the
holding company. Assume that a single individual owns all of the stock
in the holding company and that the holding company owns the entire
stock in each affiliate. In addition, assume that there are two
affiliates-a commercial bank and a small loan company-and that
both start out with cash (period I in Table 2). In period II, the small
loan company purchases
TABLE 2
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF RIsK-SHIFTING

Period
I

II
HI

Small Loan Company
Liabilities and
Assets
Net Worth
Cash 100
Liabilities 50
Equity
50
Cash
20
Liabilities 50
Loans 100
Equity
50
Cash 120
Liabilities 50
Equity
50

Commercial Banks
Liabilities and
Assets
Net Worth
Cash 100
Deposits 90
Equity 10
Cash 100
Deposits 90
Equity 10
Loans 100
Deposits 90
Equity 10

100 dollars of risky receivables at a discount of 20 dolldrs and, in
period III, transfers this paper to the bank affiliate in exchange for 100
dollars in cash. At this point the small loan affiliate shows an increase
in net worth of 20 dollars together with a perfectly liquid asset
structure, while the bank is left holding the high risk paper. If, in
period IV, the high risk paper becomes completely worthless, the
commercial bank affiliate becomes insolvent, causing a loss in equity
of 10 dollars. Assuming that the two affiliates are separately
incorporated, the small loan company does not become insolvent but,
on the contrary, shows an increase in net worth of 20 dollars.
Therefore, the owner of the holding company has increased his net
worth by 10 dollars (the 20 dollars profit less the 10 dollars loss due
to the bank failure) 5
The point is obvious. Different capital structures or variations in
leverage provide an economic incentive for one-bank holding
companies to shift risky assets to the most leveraged affiliates, which
is almost certain to be the commercial bank affiliate. Although
restrictions on the kinds of assets banks can hold may limit this
activity, these restrictions are not severe enough to represent a
55. I am indebted to Dr. George Hall of the Rand Corporation for this example.
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significant deterrent. Furthermore, since bank regulatory authorities
very often lend generous assistance to troubled banks, the incentive to
shift risky assets into the bank affiliate is even stronger. This riskshifting incentive together with the difficulty of controlling
intracorporate transactions clearly creates a problem which must be
solved before one-bank holding companies can be given free rein.
Various solutions are possible. The most direct is to require in
bankruptcy proceedings that all of the holding companies' assets be
vulnerable to attack by the insolvent bank affiliate's depositors, and,
at the same time, continue to insulate the bank's assets from the failure
of other affiliates. This procedure would lessen the incentive for riskshifting, since the bank failure would be costly in terms of capital
losses. Nevertheless, the regulatory policy of preventing bank failures
would still serve as some incentive for risk-shifting, so that a change
in regulatory policy towards greater toleration of bank failures is a
concommitant to eliminating all risk-shifting incentives. Another
partial solution would be to prohibit all non-recourse transactions
between non-bank affiliates and the bank, or, more specifically,
prohibit non-recourse transfers from non-bank affiliates to the bank.
This requirement is simply another way of making the assets of nonbank affiliates stand behind the bank's in case of bankruptcy. Since
this solution may not remedy the situation where banks lend directly
to an affiliate's risky customers, the former, more inclusive solution
seems preferable.56
A final issue in the solvency debate is the diversification argument:
that greater diversification of earning assets by combining widely
different business activities will reduce profit variance and risk to the
holding company and thereby strengthen all of its affiliates, including
the banking subsidiary. "7 The more disparate the activities, the more
56. The extent to which risk-shifting represents a serious potential danger is debatable.
Although somewhat the same incentives exist in the case of "captive" finance companies, these
companies in general have been managed prudently. See Andrews, Interest Rates, Liquidiy, and
the Financing of Captive Finance Companies, 2 NAT'L BANKING REv. 461, 480 (1965).
Nevertheless, it seems prudent to apply additional safeguards in the case of commercial banks.
57. The formula for the variance of total profits from two activities a and b is:

2
0

2
=0

a-+b

' a

2

+ o+ +2ro

b

o

a

b

The equation shows that variance of a firm's total profits is equal to the variance of the profits
of the separate enterprises (a and b) plus the last term which consists of the correlation between
the two profit streams times the square root of each variance. A positive correlation between the
profit streams gives the last term a positive value which increases total profit variance. A negative
correlation gives the last term a negative value which reduces total variance. Thus, depending upon
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likely it is that total profit variance will diminish. In contrast, very
closely related activities may actually increase profit variance and risk.
Therefore, a "pure" conglomerate is the most likely candidate to
achieve a reduction in risk.8
What are the implications for one-bank holding companies? Since
one-bank holding companies are most interested in becoming financial
conglomerates or in expanding into closely related financial activities,
the result may very well be to increase rather than reduce profit
variance. This increased risk, of course, is not a threat to the bank
subsidiary as long as a policy of separate incorporation is followed; nor
is it of any assistance. Therefore, solely on the basis of earnings
variation, one-bank holding companies are unlikely to enhance the
solvency of banks.
Some of the risk, however, in operating a bank or a financial
institution, may be associated with illiquidity rather than with0poor
profits. A financial institution with a basically sound balance sheet
may still lack the necessary liquidity to meet its short-term obligations.
But, it is also true that financial institutions are backed by government
agencies (such as the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Home
Loan Banks) designed specifically to supplement short-term liquidity
when the need arises. Therefore, liquidity may not be the problem it
appears to be at first sight.
Despite these safeguards, however, liquidity must still be
considered important because the Federal Reserve may not always be
willing to rescue banks. To alleviate this problem, one-bank holding
companies may have more to offer. Combining depository institutions
such "as banks with contractual savings institutions such as life
insurance companies may achieve a reduction in the variance of total
cash flow, since declines in bank deposits may be partially offset by
increases in flows into life insurance companies. In addition, non-bank
subsidiaries such as finance companies or even the parent company
itself could sell commercial paper to offset deposit losses, as was the
case with the 10 billion dollar reduction in negotiable certificates of
deposits which occurred during the past year. Therefore, there may be
some potential for risk reduction through joint liquidity management.
the correlation between the profit streams, total profit variance may rise or fall. If it falls, we
argue that risk is reduced; if it rises, risk is increased. The same reasoning is also applicable to
variances in cash flows, which may measure the risk of insolvency due to illiquidity. See Adelman,
The Anti-nergerAct, 1950-60, 51 Am. ECON. REv. at 241.42 (1961).
58. For a recent verification of this judgment, see Smith & Schreiner, A Portfolio A nalysis
of ConglomerateDiversification, 24 J. FINANCE 413 (1969).
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In summary, one-bank holding companies do raise a few problems
with respect to financial solvency, but none that require complete
prohibition as a solution. The most critical problem is that of riskshifting through the shuffling of risky assets. This difficulty can be
mitigated by requiring (1) all of the holding companies' assets to stand
behind the bank's assets in the event of bankruptcy, and (2) a separate
incorporation to insulate the bank from the insolvency of other
affiliates. These requirements greatly reduce the economic incentives
that induce risk-shifting. If the one-bank holding companies are given
free rein, these are the minimum safeguards necessary to insure the
solvency of the banking system.
D.

The EJfectiveness oJ'Monetary Polic'

A final consideration is the effectiveness of monetary policy. Onebank holding companies may have an impact on the effectiveness of
monetary pblicy in two ways: (1) by enabling certain banks to
circumvent Regulation Q,'1 and create a discriminatory competitive
advantage which may cause undesirable deposit flows and liquidity
problems; and (2) by altering banks' liability structures and therefore
their required reserves, which may loosen the Federal Reserve's control
over credit. Both of these effects, we shall see, are the consequence of
one-bank holding companies being able to sell non-deposit debt
instruments, such as commercial paper."
Although commercial banks can now sell short-term paper
directly, the Federal Reserve has ruled that such liabilities are to be
treated as time deposits, which are subject to the usual reserve
requirements as well as to the limitations of Regulation Q.11 The
liabilities of one-bank holding companies, on the other hand, are
outside the purview of Federal Reserve regulation. Thus, having
complete freedom to issue short-term paper, a one-bank holding
company may use such paper to replace a bank-affiliate's deposits
(especially its certificate of deposits), which will reduce the bank59. 52 FED. REs. BULL. 1451 (1966). Regulation Q gives federal bank supervisory agencies
the authority to set interest rate ceilings on the deposits of commercial banks, mutual savings
banks, and savings and loan associations.
60. The question of whether one-bank holding companies will eventually alter the banking
structure in ways that affect the transmission of monetary policy is not considered a likely
possibility. Even if there is a shift of banking deposits from small to large banks, monetary policy
should not be seriously hampered. See Peltzman, The Banking Structure and the Transmission
of Monetary Policy, 24 J. FINANCE 387 (1969).
61. 52 FED. Rts. BULL. 963 (1966).
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affiliate's required reserves and permit it (as well as the banking system
62
as a whole) to expand the total volume of credit outstanding.
Let the following represent the initial partial balance sheets of the
parent holding company, the bank-affiliate, and Corporation Y, which
holds a certificate of deposit issued by the bank. The bank holds 50
dollars of required reserves since there is a five percent reserve
requirement against time deposits, and holds 100 dollars of cash, which
we will assume is its minimum desired cash balance for liquidity
purposes. The remaininder of its assets consists of loans.
HOLDING COMPANY

Assets

0

Liabilities

0

BANK AFFILIATE

Assets

Liabilities

Cash:

Time

100

Deposits:

Reserves:

1000

CORPORATION Y

Assets

Liabilities

CD Time

General

Deposit:

Liabilities:

100

100

50
Loans:
850

Suppose the holding company now sells 100 dollars of commercial
paper to Corporation Y, which is enticed to convert its CD into the
holding company's commercial paper by a higher yield or interest rate.
To reflect this transaction, the respective balance sheets become
(assuming a sixteen percent reserve requirement against demand
deposits):
HOLDING COMPANY

L
Commercial
Demand
paper
deposits held
Liabilities:
at bank
100
affiliate: 100
A

BANK AFFILIATE

A
Cash:

89
Reserves:
61

L
Time

Deposits:
900
Demand

Loans:

Deposits

850

held by
Hold. Co.:

CORPORATION Y

A

L

Commercial

General

Paper of

Liabilities:

Hold. Co.:

100

100

100
The bank-affiliate's required reserves increase by eleven dollars, but
this increase is very temporary since the parent company will not
continue holding demand deposits.
Suppose that the holding company uses its newly augmented
demand balance to purchase 100 dollars of the bank-affiliate's assets,
62. Up to the present only a few unregistered bank holding companies have made use of
this device. See N.Y. Times, March 27, 1969, at 65, cols. 2, 3.
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such as 100 dollars of its loans. 3 The balance sheets of the parent
holding company and the bank change to (assume that the loans are
purchased at face value):
HOLDING COMPANY

Assets

Loans Purchased
from bank
affiliate:
100

Liabilities

Commercial
paper
liability:
100

BANK AFFILIATES

Assets

Reserves: 45
Cash: 105
Loans: 150

Liabilities

Time
Deposits:
900

Note that the bank-affiliate's required reserves are reduced by five
dollars, its cash balances augmented by five dollars, and its deposit
liabilities reduced by 100 dollars. Since the bank's initial desired cash
balance was 100 dollars, it now holds five dollars "too much" in cash.
(The reduction in its deposit liabilities should also lower its desired cash
balance to below 100 dollars.) Note also that the volume of total credit
outstanding has not decreased. Although bank credit has declined by
100 dollars, or bank loans have declined by 100 dollars, this decline
was matched by what appears as an equal increase in credit extended
by the parent holding company. No one has less credit to spend than
before.
But the ramifications of these transactions will not be complete
until the bank-affiliate brings its actual cash balance into equilibrium
with its desired cash balance. Since it holds excess balances of five
dollars, the bank will either purchase securities or make additional
loans. For the banking system as a whole, the impact of these portfolio
adjustments will not be complete until total bank deposits (either
demand or time) have increased to a level sufficient to absorb the excess
balances into required reserves. This could be when time deposits
increase by 100 dollars, or demand deposits by approximately 30
dollars, or some combination of these results. The crucial point and
important consequence is that bank credit will be expanded by some
additional amount (bank assets increase when bank deposits increase),
so that total credit outstanding (bank and non-bank) will be greater
than it was initially.
How does this result affect monetary policy? If the Federal
Reserve's objective is to reduce or limit credit availability, the
foregoing device works against this policy by enabling credit expansion
63. There are, of course, other means by which a holding company could transfer funds to
its bank-affiliate: purchasing the bank's investment securities, long-term debentures, equity, etc.
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just when the Federal Reserve is trying to achieve credit constraint. Of
course, if the Federal Reserve were able to predict the exact magnitude
of this expansionary effect, it could employ off-setting measures, such
as further decreases in bank reserves to neutralize the effect. Predicting
this effect, however, will be difficult. Its magnitude will depend upon
the interest rate that bank holding companies choose to pay on their
commercial paper and on the cross-elasticity of demand of bank
depositors, both of which may vary substantially over a business cycle.
Indeed, holding companies could conceivably vary their interest rates
to offset the Federal Reserve's (offsetting) policy measures. Thus,
during periods of credit restriction, such as inflationary episodes, onebank holding companies may undermine the effectiveness of monetary
policy.64
Are one-bank holding companies really an integral part of this
scheme, or are they merely being used to achieve an end that banks
could achieve anyway? For example\ .what is to prevent banks from
directly selling their assets to their depositors, instead of doing it
indirectly through the parent holding company? The answer is that
banks themselves are not able to supply an attractive substitute asset,
or they are not able to offer depositors a liquid asset sufficiently
substitutable for deposits. Most depositors are not interested in
exchanging very liquid deposits for illiquid loans, and banks will not
usually be in a position to sell short-term liquid assets (such as
Treasury Bills) to their depositors."5 Assuming that banks have already
reduced their liquid assets to the desired level (or minimum level
believed necessary), which will be the case during tight money, banks
will clearly be unwilling to sell liquid assets in order to reduce deposits
by only an equivalent amount. This transaction would leave a bank
with an undesirably low liquid asset to deposit ratio. (Since this ratio
has a value of less than one, reducing both the numerator and
denominator by equal amounts will reduce the value of the ratio even
further.)
64. Although the above discussion implicitly assumes that the Federal Reserve's over-all
objective is to control total credit outstanding, the point of the analysis also holds true if the
Federal Reserve's objective is some level of the interest rate, since interest rates are affected by
the supply of loanable funds.
65. Banks have used the direct device of selling their loans under a repurchase agreement,

which accomplishes the same end. The repurchase provision makes the loans more liquid and
therefore attractive to depositors. The Federal Reserve, however, has recently closed this avenue
by imposing reserve requirements on the liabilities which arise from such sales. See N.Y. Times,
July 25, 1969, at 67, col. I.
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One-bank holding companies, on the other hand, can provide
assets which are attractive to depositors. For example, commercial
paper has a short maturity and can be made highly liquid through
some type of repurchase arrangement. In addition, obligations of the
parent of an unregistered holding company (or of a non-bank
subsidiary) are not subject to the limitations of Regulation Q,
permitting more flexibility in the yields which can be offered to
depositors. Both of these aspects combine to make one-bank holding
companies an attractive organizational structure to banks, but a
potentially troublesome problem for monetary policy.
A final implication of holding companies selling commercial paper
is the discriminatory competitive advantage it may give to banks
affiliated with holding companies, vis-a-vis non-affiliated banks and
savings institutions. Since unregistered holding companies (and
therefore, indirectly, affiliated banks) are not subject to interest rate
regulations as are unaffiliated banks and savings institutions, affiliated
banks have a definite advantage in competing for savings deposits,
especially for large depositors. If this competitive edge were substantial,
it would establish strong incentives for all banks and savings
institutions to form one-bank holding companies, or at least to
establish an affiliation with one. At critical times, moreover, this
competitive advantage may cause severe liquidity strains to be placed
on the financial system by causing large deposit flows from savings
institutions into affiliated banks.
How important is all this for the conduct of monetary policy?
Generally speaking, its importance will vary directly with the potential
magnitude of the deposit shifts. If a large volume of depositors stand
ready to exchange their deposits for assets like commercial paper at
small yield differentials, it will be a substantial problem for monetary
authorities. If on the other hand, the cross-elasticity of substitution of
deposits for commercial paper is small (to use the correct economic
jargon), the problem will be minimal. The appropriateness of this
measure of importance is obvious: large shifts in deposits will be
associated with large changes in total credit outstanding and vice versa.
Further, greater deposit sensitivity to yield differentials will subject
regulated institutions like saving and loan associations to greater
liquidity strains. Thus the question of importance turns on the likely
magntiude of the cross-elasticity of substitution of deposits for
substitute assets issued by one-bank holding companies.
Assuming that holding companies are unable to issue (or create)
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a more attractive asset than commercial paper, the problem reduces to
determining which depositors might consider commercial paper as a
reasonably good substitute. To the ordinary small saver or checking
account depositor, commercial paper is not liquid enough. In addition,
their deposits are so small that they would probably not find the gain
large enough to make it worthwhile to switch." It is with respect to
large depositors, especially holders of negotiable certificates of deposits,
that commercial paper may become a problem-CD holders are less
interested in liquidity and more interested in return than are small
depositors. Many of these depositors are large corporations which
temporarily invest their liquid assets in an effort to raise earnings.
If the problem can be limited to large depositors, particularly
owners of large certificates of deposits, it may be less bothersome than
initially suspected. It would, for example, seem to be much less of a
liquidity threat to savings institutions, since most deposit customers of
these instituions are small and may therefore not be responsive to
higher yields on commercial paper issued by holding companies. In
addition, the potential magnitude of the problem is greatly reduced:
large certificates of deposits, at their highest level, amounted to only
about 25 billion dollars, or roughly seven percent of total bank
deposits.17 Nevertheless, even deposit shifts of this magnitude can be
troublesome to monetary authorities at critical times, as the Federal
Reserve's present concern over the fifteen billion dollars of Eurodollar
borrowings clearly indicates. 68 Moreover, there is also a distinct
possibility that one-bank holding companies may at any time develop
new substitute assets which are attractive to an even larger volume of
depositors, thereby increasing the problem significantly.69 It would
seem wise, therefore, to close this loophole by regulation before it can
develop into a larger problem for monetary authorities.
Bringing one-bank holding companies under the supervision of the
Federal Reserve would be sufficient to control this problem. Reserve
66. The "transaction" and "search" costs will be the same for all sizes of depositors, but
the expected return of switching will vary proportionately with the size of the deposit, making it
more worthwhile for large depositors to make the change.
67. Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, U.S. FinancialData, at 8 (July 2, 1969).
68. American banks' borrowing of Eurodollars is a similar "loss of control" problem for
the Federal Reserve, since these borrowings are largely unregulated and also affect the
composition of the banks' liabilities and therefore required reserves. See Saunders, American
Banks in London's Eurodollar Market, 4 NAT'L BANKING REV. 21 (1966); MARTENSON, THE
EURODOLLAR MARKET (1964).
69. Ifthe Eurodollar loophole were closed, as the Federal Reserve is now trying to do, the
one-bank holding company loophole would undoubtedly see more action for this reason alone. -
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requirements could be imposed directly on short-term liabilities of the
parent holding company, or on its non-bank subsidiaries, although
such regulation may be too much of a "shot-gun" approach.
Alternatively, the Federal Reserve could impose tight controls on interaffiliate transactions, preventing, for example, bank-affiliates from
selling their loans to other holding company affiliates. Informal
pressure may be still another technique for exercising control. In short,
to control their potentially adverse effects on monetary policy, onebank holding companies should be required to register with the Federal
Reserve and should be made subject to the same powers the Federal
Reserve now exercises over multi-bank holding companies. There is,
however, as far as considerations of monetary policy are concerned, no
need for a complete prohibition of one-bank holding companies.
IV.

OVERALL EVALUATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In traversing the broad subject of one-bank holding companies, a
number of specific judgments were made. First, the potential net
impact of one-bank holding companies on competition need not be
adverse. Although holding companies may limit competition either by
engaging in informal tying and reciprocal agreements or by restraining
the competitive behavior of smaller rivals, they will also exert a strong
procompetitive effect by increasing both actual and threatened entry
into many industries. Further, if acquisitions by one-bank holding
companies are made subject to the approval of a regulatory agency,
such as the Federal Reserve Board, authorities can substantially
mitigate the adverse competitive effects, since the potential seriousness
of these effects is largely dependent upon the underlying market
structure. In others words, if given adequate power, regulatory
authorities can prevent the development of a market structure
conducive to the widespread and effective use of anticompetitive
practices, while at the same time encourage competition by permitting
holding companies to enter new fields.
Secondly, one-bank holding companies will clearly achieve some
economies of scale. The most important gains in efficiency will come
from affiliations among banks and non-bank financial institutions.
Little or no economies, however, can be expected to result from
affiliations of banks and financial institutions with non-financial
companies. Thirdly, one-bank holding companies may engage in
certain practices (such as the shifting of risky assets among affiliates),
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which if left unchecked could undermine the solvency of the banking
system. Lastly, since they are outside the sphere of Federal Reserve
regulation, one-bank holding companies may interfere with the effective
implementation of monetary policy.
Despite the two latter findings, however, the overall conclusion of
this paper is that one-bank holding companies should not be prohibited
outright. Rather, they should be constructively regulated. As indicated
in the earlier discussions, direct regulation can be used to eliminate the
economic incentives which threaten bank solvency. In addition, by
strengthening the Federal Reserve's control, regulation can prevent
holding companies from hindering monetary policy. Thus, although the
overall conclusion is that one-bank holding companies should be
permitted, this conclusion is contingent upon the adoption of certain
safeguarding regulations. A policy of permitting one-bank holding
companies to operate under regulation is superior to either a policy of
complete freedom or a policy of complete prohibition. It allows us to
enjoy the benefits associated with increased efficiency and competition, but to escape the dangers inherent in the holding company form
of organization.
What are the implications of all this for the current legislative
inquiry? Should Congress enact new legislation, and, if so, what kind?
The following are the policy recommendations suggested by the
preceding analysis:
(1) One-bank holding companies should be required to register
with the Federal Reserve and submit to regulation;
(2) "Effective control" should be made the primary test of
whether equity ownership in a bank necessitates registration as a onebank holding company;
(3) Acquisitions of one-bank holding companies should require
the approval of the Federal Reserve and be subject to a "public
interest" standard similar to that contained in the Bank Merger Act
of 1966.70 In addition, all acquisitions and practices of bank holding
companies should remain subject to the antitrust laws;
(4) All subsidiaries of one-bank holding companies should be
required to be incorporated as completely separate legal entities; but
(5) All assets of non-bank companies or subsidiaries should be
made subject to attack in bankruptcy proceedings by the depositors of
an insolvent affiliated bank;
70.

12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. Ili 1968).
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(6) The Federal Reserve should be permitted to prohibit
interaffiliate transactions which it considers to be either a threat to
bank solvency or a significant interference with its control over
monetary policy:
(7) The Federal Reserve Board should be given discretionary
authority to decide which non-bank activities bank holding companies"
should be permitted to engage in. The criteria for approval should be
whether entry into a particular activity increases or decreases
competition, increases or decreases efficiency, threatens bank solvency,
or significantly interferes with monetary policy. In particular, the
"incidental to the business of banking" test should be discarded.
These policy recommendations flow directly from an analysis of
the economic consequences of one-bank holding companies. It is
important to point out, therefore, that they may be subject to
modification on the basis of non-economic or quasi-economic
considerations such as the social or political ramifications of holding
companies. In fact, one of these aspects has received such widespread
attention that to end this discussion without at least mentioning it
would be to expose the entire paper to a charge of irrelevancy; that
aspect' is bigness. A recurring uneasiness is that one-bank holding
companies (and conglomerates in general) will become too large to be
compatible with democratic ideals, or that they will wield so much
power and influence as to make our democratic system unworkable.
There can be no doubt that if bank holding companies are permitted
to diversify along the lines recommended, the result will be larger firms
and a greater concentration of economic, political, and social power.
This problem, however, is not strictly speaking a one-bank holding
company issue. It is rather a more general problem, which should be
dealt with on a general basis. Giant non-bank conglomerates, large
labor unions, and perhaps even big government are also part of the
"bigness" problem. If we were to decide to arrest the trend towards
bigness by establishing a policy of absolute size limitations on
71. As long as the recommended regulatory safeguards are also made applicable to multibank holding companies, no distinction need be made between them and one-bank holding
companies.
72. The Federal Reserve Board was chosen as the most appropriate agency in which to vest
regulatory power over bank holding companies because: (a) the Board presently regulates multi-

bank holding companies, (b) it alone has responsibility for monetary policy, (c) it has a large,
well trained staff and ample resources at its disposal, and (d) it is undesirable to divide supervisory
authority among several agencies (such as the Comptroller of the Currency or the FDIC), since
experience indicates that such division leads to rivalry and conflicts of interest.
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businesses and other organizations, this policy should be applied in a
rational way to all segments of the economy, including banking and
bank holding companies. Thus, as important as the "bigness" problem
is, it should not be allowed to obscure the economic logic of one-bank
holding companies.

